16. Circuit Pitfalls, Resilient Systems

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VLSI Design
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Bad Circuit 1

- Circuit
  - 2:1 multiplexer



- Symptom
  - Mux works when selected D is 0 but not 1
  - Or fails at low V_{DD}
  - Or fails in SFSF corner
- Principle: Threshold drop
  - X never rises above $V_{DD} - V_t$
  - V_t is raised by the body effect
  - The threshold drop is most serious as V_t becomes a greater fraction of VDD
- Solution: Use transmission gates, not pass transistors

Bad Circuit 2

- Circuit
  - Latch



- Symptom
  - Load a 0 into Q
  - Set $\phi = 0$
  - Eventually Q spontaneously flips to 1
- Principle: Leakage
  - X is a dynamic node holding a value as charge on the node
  - Eventually, subthreshold leakage may disturb charge

- Solution: Staticize node with feedback
  - Or, periodically refresh node (this requires a fast clock, and is not practical for processes with big leakage)



Bad Circuit 3

- Circuit
  - Domino AND gate



- Symptom
  - Precharge gate (Y = 0)
  - Then evaluate
  - Eventually Y spontaneously flips to 1



- Principle: Leakage
  - X is a dynamic node holding value as charge on the node
  - Eventually subthreshold leakage may disturb charge
- Solution: Keeper

Bad Circuit 4

- Circuit
  - Pseudo-nMOS OR



- Symptom
  - When only one input is true, Y = 0
  - Perhaps only happens in SF corner

- Principle: Ratio Failure
  - nMOS and pMOS fight each other
  - If the pMOS is too strong, nMOS cannot pull X low enough
- Solution: Check that ratio is satisfied in all corners

Bad Circuit 5

- Circuit
  - Latch



- Symptom
  - Q stuck at 1
  - May only happen for certain latches where input is driven by a small gate located far away

- Principle: Ratio failure (again)
  - Series resistance of D driver, wire resistance, and transmission gate gate must be much less than weak feedback inverter

- Solution: Check relative strengths
  - Avoid unbuffered diffusion inputs where driver is unknown



Bad Circuit 6

- Circuit
  - Domino AND gate



- Principle: Charge sharing
  - If X was low, it shares charge with Y
- Solution: Limit charge sharing
  - Safe if $C_Y >> C_X$
  - Or, precharge node X too

- Symptom
  - Precharge gate while A = B = 0, so Z = 0
  - Set ϕ= 1
  - A rises
  - Z is observed to sometimes rise



$$V_X = V_Y = \frac{C_Y}{C_X + C_Y} V_{DD}$$

Bad Circuit 7

- Circuit
  - Dynamic gate + latch



- Symptom
  - Precharge gate while transmission gate latch is opaque
  - Evaluate
  - When latch becomes transparent, X falls
- Principle: Charge sharing
  - If Y was low, it shares charge with X
- Solution: Buffer dynamic nodes before driving transmission gate

Bad Circuit 8

- Circuit
  - Latch



- Symptom
  - Q changes while latch is opaque
  - Especially if D comes from a far-away driver

- Principle: Diffusion Input Noise Sensitivity
  - If $V_D < -V_t$, transmission gate turns on
  - Most likely because of power supply noise or coupling on D

- Solution: Buffer D locally



Bad Circuit 9

- Circuit
  - Anything
- Symptom
  - Some gates are slower than expected
- Principle: Hot Spots and Power Supply Noise





Noise

- Sources
  - Power supply noise/ground bounce
  - Capacitive coupling
  - Substrate coupling
  - Charge sharing
  - Leakage
  - Noise feedthrough
- Consequences
  - Increased delay (for noise to settle out)
  - Or incorrect computations

Visualization of substrate noise



Source: electronicproducts.com

Line-to-substrate coupling



Electromigration

- "Electron wind" causes movement of metal atoms along wires
- Excessive electromigration leads to open circuits
- Most significant for unidirectional currents (DC)
  - Depends on current density J_{dc} (current/area)
  - Exponential dependence on temperature
  - Black's Equation:

$$MTTF \propto \frac{e^{\frac{E_a}{kT}}}{J_{dc}^n},$$

    where E_a is the activation energy (empirically determined by stress testing at high temperatures), and n is typically 2
  - Typical limits: $J_{dc} < 1 - 2\ mA/\mu m^2$



Line-open failure

Open failure in contact plug

Self Heating

- Current through wire resistance generates heat
  - Oxide surrounding wires is a thermal insulator
  - Heat tends to build up in wires
  - Hotter wires are more resistive, slower
- Self-heating limits AC current densities for reliability

$$I_{rms} = \sqrt{\frac{\int_0^T I(t)^2 dt}{T}}$$

  - Typical limits: $J_{rms} < 15\ mA/\mu m^2$

Self heating a problem for SOI circuits and 3-D systems

Modeling self heating, Silvaco



Latchup

- Latchup: positive feedback leading to V_{DD} – GND short
  - Major problem for 1970s CMOS processes before it was well understood
- Avoid by minimizing resistance of body to GND/V_{DD}
  - Use plenty of substrate and well taps



Guard Rings

- Latchup risk greatest when diffusion-to-substrate diodes could become forward-biased
- Surround sensitive region with guard ring to collect injected charge



Overvoltage

- High voltages can damage transistors
  - Electrostatic discharge (ESD)
  - Oxide arcing
  - Punchthrough
  - Time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB)
    - Accumulated wear from tunneling currents
- Requires low V_{DD} for thin oxides and short channels
- Use ESD protection structures where chip meets real world

Transient suppression device specifications

for automotive applications

Source: dev.emcelettronica.com



Hot Carriers

- Electric fields across channel impart high energies to some carriers
  - These "hot" carriers may be blasted into the gate oxide where they become trapped
  - Accumulation of charge in oxide causes shift in V_t over time
  - Eventually V_t shifts too far for devices to operate correctly
- Choose V_{DD} to achieve reasonable product lifetime
  - Worst problems for inverters and NORs with slow input rise time and long propagation delays



Source: Kiethley Application Note 2535

Bias Temperature Instability



Mechanism

- Even when no carriers moving from source to drain, the gate voltage can cause charges to migrate into the insulating gate oxide
- Phenomenon is partly reversible
- Charges leave the oxide after the gate voltage is removed

Source: Keane and Kim, IEEE Spectrum, May 2011

NBTI Mechanism and Degradation



- Hole interaction with oxide causes Si-H bonds to break
- Change is positive charge density in traps increases V_t
- When stress is removed, H atoms diffuse back to interface and anneal the broken bond
- DC stress causes much shorter lifetime



Source: Peters, Semiconductor International, March 1, 2004

Transistor Aging and Failure Prediction



Guardband violation due to transistor aging



Example of an aging sensor

Agarwal et al., VTS 2007

Oxide Breakdown

Mechanism

- Voltage across the gate can also cause electrically active defects within the oxide layer
- The defects can trap charges
- If enough of the charges accumulate, they can create a short, causing a catastrophic failure of the transistor

Source: Keane and Kim, IEEE Spectrum, May 2011

Summary

- Static CMOS gates are very robust
  - Will settle to correct value if designed with sufficient margins and if you wait long enough
- Other circuits suffer from a variety of pitfalls
  - Tradeoff between performance and robustness
- Very important to check circuits for pitfalls
  - For large chips, you need an automatic checker
  - Design rules aren't worth the paper they are printed on unless you back them up with a tool

Industry Estimates of Expected Lifetimes of Chips



Source: Sperling, "Making Chips To Last Their Expected Lifetimes," *Semiconductor Engineering*, October 21, 2020.

Classes of Dependable Systems

- Systems Designed for Very Long Life
  - Spacecraft with multiyear missions, inaccessible systems
  - Techniques: Replication (spares), error coding, monitoring, shielding
- Safety-Critical Systems
  - Flight control computers, nuclear-plant shutdown, medical monitoring, automobile braking control
  - Techniques: Replication with voting, time redundancy, design diversity
- High-Availability Systems
  - Telephone switching centers, server farms, banking systems, e-commerce
  - Techniques: Hardware and Information redundancy, backup schemes, hot-swap, recovery
- Consumer Products?
  - PCs, PDAs, smart phones
  - Techniques: parity checks for memories, intrusion tolerance, virus detection, low cost of replacement

Historical Perspective

Dionysius Lardner

"The most certain and effectual check upon errors which arise in the process of computation, is to cause the same computations to be made by separate and independent computers; and this check is rendered still more decisive if they make their computations by different methods,"
Dionysius Lardner, "Babbage's calculating engine," *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 59, no. 120, pp. 263–327, 1834.

Key Papers in 1956

Moore and Shannon, "Reliable circuits using less reliable relays," Bell System Technical Journal

von Neumann, "Probabilistic logic and synthesis of reliable organism from unreliable components," Annals of mathematical studies, Princeton University Press

Reliable Relay Networks

Shannon, 1956



Can be applied to MOS transistors

- A single open or short of a transistor (relay) will be masked by the network
- Many multiple faults will also be tolerated

NAND Multiplexing – Massive Redundancy

Inspired by 1956 von Neumann paper for logic implemented in nanotechnologies



Approach

- Similar to NMR, but voting carried out in a *bundle*
- Executive stage – performs operations
- Restorative stage – reduces degradation caused by errors from the executive stage, acting as output "amplifier"

Error-Detecting and Correcting Codes

One way of detecting (and correcting) errors in data transmission and storage, is to encode data, with a subset of the words being code words

Reasonable errors will change a code word to a non-code word, and the errors will be detectable

Errors which transform one code word into another will not be detectable

"Error Models" relate likely physical faults to the errors that they could cause

Distance between two code words is the number of distinct changes needed to change one code word into the other

Example: Parity codes

Distance Properties

The Hamming Weight of a vector, X, $W(X)$ is the number of non-zero components of X

The Hamming Distance between two vectors, X and Y, $d(X, Y)$, is the number of components in which they differ

The minimum distance of a code is the minimum of Hamming distances between all pairs of code words

To detect d-bit errors, need a code with distance $d + 1$, to correct d-bit errors, need a code with distance $2d + 1$.
Example:



Self-Checking Circuits

Self-Checking Circuits – encoded inputs and outputs, output checker



Boeing 777 Primary Flight Computer



Reliability, Availability, Safety

- Reliability (R(t))
  - Conditional probability that a system provides continuous proper service in the interval [0,t] given that it provided desired service at time 0
  - Simple Reliability function (exponential): $R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$, Constant *Failure Rate* λ
- Mean Time to Failure, MTTF
  - MTTF $= \int_0^\infty R(t)dt$
  - For an exponential reliability function, MTTF $= 1/\lambda$
- Availability A(t)
  - Fraction of time that system is in the operational state (providing service) during the interval [0,t]
  - Function of both failure rate (λ) and repair rate (μ)
  - Steady-State Availability, $A = \frac{MTTF}{MTTF+MTTR} = \frac{\lambda}{\lambda+\mu}$

"Markov Chain" for a simple system with repair



Reliability

View a system as providing a **service**

Faults $\Longrightarrow$ Errors $\Longrightarrow$ Failures

- Fault: an anomalous physical condition
- Error: an incorrect logic value as a consequence of the fault
- Failure: the condition where the system does not provide the expected service



Are "Fault Tolerance" and "Resilience" the Same?

Fault Tolerance

- Errors (due to faults) detected and corrected, fault located, reconfiguration around faulty unit
- System designed to tolerate classes of faults
- User does not see anything wrong (except perhaps an additional delay)
- Service does not suffer any down time

Resilience

- User may see errors during the service, but the final results are correct
- System requires on-line error detection, but may use checkpoints, retry, etc., to achieve resilience
- Ability to deal with "unknown" faults
- Service may be down intermittently

Example of Resilience – Single Engine Airplane

From Malibu Jetprop pilot's operating handbook

- If loss of power occurs at altitude, trim the aircraft for best gliding angle (90 KIAS) and look for a suitable field.
- At best glide angle, no wind, with the engine stopped and the propeller feathered, the aircraft will travel approximately 2 miles for each thousand feet of altitude.

Achieving Resilience

Start with fault-free hardware

- Testing after manufacturing
- On-line tests to detect wearout and degradation

Detection is key

- Detect errors in results of computations
- Application-level results are, ultimately, what are important

Ensure correct results at the application level

- Appropriate checks at different levels of the design
- High-level checks tend to have lower overheads

Application-Level Fault Tolerance

Reduce the cost of fault tolerance by looking at computations at a higher level

Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT), (Huang and Abraham, 1984)

- Encode data at a high level (application level)
- Design algorithm to operate on encoded input data and produce encoded output data
- Distribute computation tasks among multiple computation units, so that failure of a unit affects only a portion of the output data, enabling the correct data to be recovered

Very general fault model: A computation unit can produce any arbitrary logical output under failure

Communication paths checked using coding techniques

Illustration of Application to Matrix Operations



ABFT applied to DGEMM



Source: Bosilca, Delmas, Dongarra and Langou, 2008.

Performance Under Failure

Performance (GFLOPS/sec/proc) of PBLAS PDGEMM, ABFT BLAS PDGEMM (0 failure), and ABFT BLAS PDGEMM (1 failure)



Error Resilience in Non-Linear Control Systems



Brake by Wire



Lower costs, improved stopping distances

Electromechanical brakes (vs. hydraulic



Error Detection and Correction in Non-Linear Control Systems (Banerjee, 2019)

Brake by Wire algorithm executing on embedded processor



Error Detection and Correction in Brake by Wire System



Approach to dealing with soft errors

- When transient error is detected, results of the control loop (output to actuator) ignored for a few cycles till no error is seen.

Constraints on Embedded Systems

Myriad of Intelligent systems

- Cost, power consumption constraints
- In critical applications, **resiliency** is very important

Example: self-driving cars

- 100 Million lines of code for software, sensing and actuation
- 64 TOPS for cognition and control functions

Need a broader definition of resilience

Classic definitions of resiliency have been narrow

- Focused on hardware failures
- What about design bugs?
  - Duplication (such as in ISO 26262) will not be sufficient
- Resilience to external attacks?

Design Bugs

Logic bugs

- Verification is dominating the design cycle
- Unlikely that all design bugs are caught before deployment
- Diversity is necessary to deal with design bugs

Design margins

- Effects of real bugs are not easy to duplicate (in many cases, error latencies of many millions (or billions) of cycles)
- Gray: concepts of **Bohr bugs** (repeatable) versus **Heisenbugs** (not seen to be repeatable)

Bugs and design margins could be exploited by an attacker

Errors Not Repeatable – "Heisenbugs"



Dealing with Security – Very Different From Dealing with Physical Faults or Errors

Attacks are **Intentional**

- Faults and Errors related to design or physical causes are **systematic** **or** **random**
- Attacks are **deliberate**
  - Initiated by a clever adversary

Security Attacks

Hardware Trojans

- Malicious modification of designs
- Example of analog circuitry modifying a digital chip – extremely difficult to identify
- Design diversity may be a solution

External attacks

- Classic work (Abadi) suggested control flow checking to detect execution of undesired code
- Effects of attacks could include modification of data, execution sequences, denial of service, etc.
  - Require data checks in addition to control-flow checks
  - Need to detect DoS attacks during operation – example, shutting down GPS system (or spoofing GPS position)

Example: Attacks on Automobiles

Automotive Bus – CAN

- Controller Area Bus (CAN) – robust vehicle bus standard
- Allows applications in microcontrollers and devices to communicate with other applications without a host computer

Attacks on CAN bus

- Allows the attacker to control the operation of an automobile over a WiFi network
- Attack was facilitated by the sharing of critical functions with automobile entertainment system

IC Design Process with Possible Attacks





Source: Yang et. al, Communications of the ACM, September 2017.

Trojans Could be Extremely Difficult to Detect

Analog Trojan in a Digital System

- Fabrication-time attack with trigger in the analog domain
- Based on charge accumulating on a capacitor from infrequent events inside the processor
- Very small area, and low impact on power and timing



Control Flow Deviation Detection for Application Level Security

Attacks subvert the control flow of the software

- Insert control-flow checks in the code (particularly useful for embedded software)
- Run-time signatures and checks can be inserted automatically during compile time

Implementation

- Signature update instructions inserted at the beginning and end of each function, as well as before and after the call instructions
- Illegal branches will result in signature mismatches

Proposed in 2005 (Abadi)

Attacks on Embedded Systems



Source: Papp et al, Thirteenth Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), 2015.

Types of Attacks

- Control hijacking attacks
- Reverse engineering
- Malware
- Injected crafted packets or inputs
- Eavesdropping
- Brute-force search attacks
- Attacks during normal usage

Effects of Attacks

- Denial of service
- Code execution
- Integrity violation
- Information leakage
- Illegitimate access
- Financial loss
- Degraded level of protection
- Miscellaneous

Android Pixel 2 Security Module

Tamper Resistant Hardware

- Discrete chip separate from the SoC, with its own flash, RAM
- Can control its own execution, and is robust against side channel information leakage attacks
- Loads its OS and software directly from internal ROM and flash, and controls all updates
- Resilient against fault injection and side channel attacks



Source: X. Xin, Android Developers Blog, 13 November 2017